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 1 
COMPETITION AND PRIVACY IN WEB 2.0 AND THE 
CLOUD 
Randal C. Picker* 
We are once again changing how we use computers.  In the past, we 
moved from mainframes to mini computers to freestanding personal com-
puters.  That was a powerful shift in control and organizational structure.  
Mainframes were rare and, as such, were tended to with loving care and 
serviced by a small caste of computing priests.  In contrast, PCs were eve-
rywhere: on every knowledge worker’s desk and eventually in the family 
room of many homes.  In the PC age, the computer desktop was the most 
valuable real estate around, and for most people, that meant Microsoft Win-
dows. 
Microsoft Windows was—and is—both product and delivery system.  
Product in the sense that Windows performs certain functions that all oper-
ating systems perform.  Windows tracks files, sends data through ports for 
printing, and tells your computer screen how to display fonts and images—
all things that we expect of our operating systems.  But Windows is more 
than that: Windows delivers software.  Before the advent of the Internet, 
software delivery was difficult.  A consumer might find the software was 
pre-installed on a new PC.  Alternately, the consumer could go to a com-
puter store—remember those?—and plunk down her credit card, and walk 
out with a large, almost empty box that had, buried within it, a CD with 
new software. 
Microsoft had a special role in software delivery because it could guar-
antee delivery by just incorporating the new software into Windows.  With 
each new release of Windows—from Windows 3.1 to Windows 95 to 98 
and on towards Vista—Microsoft expanded the footprint of Windows.  This 
expanded footprint was not just a question of taking up more hard drive 
space; Windows got bigger because it expanded its functionality.  In doing 
so, it killed off what had been separate markets in freestanding functions 
provided by other companies.  Disk fragmentation was once a separate 
product category, but it wasn’t anymore once Microsoft added that function 
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to Windows itself.  Including a product in the next version of Windows in-
sured its widespread distribution as each version of Windows quickly ex-
panded its market share. 
In a basic sense, Windows was fundamentally unbounded.  That is, 
there was no obvious boundary for the scope of functions that might be em-
braced in Windows.1  This boundlessness mattered most when we intro-
duced ubiquitous networks to link computers together to create the Internet 
and the Web.  The move to networked devices created a possible inflection 
point, a point of churn and competition as different firms sought the upper-
hand in the new computing space.  In his May, 1995 Internet Tidal Wave 
memo, Bill Gates famously feared that Netscape would ―commoditize the 
underlying operating system.‖2  Gates feared that users would no longer 
care what operating system ran on their computers; instead, consumers 
would care only about the browser that sat on top of the operating system.  
Windows was going to become plumbing, important to be sure, but funda-
mentally anonymous and only noticed when it wasn’t working right.  Mi-
crosoft moved aggressively against Netscape and relied heavily on its 
ability to bundle Internet Explorer with Windows at no additional charge to 
defeat Netscape.  Microsoft won its battle against Netscape, although it did 
so in ways found to be illegal by competition authorities in the United 
States.3 
But Microsoft seems to be losing the larger war suggested in the Inter-
net Tidal Wave.  We are in the midst of two large related shifts in our com-
puting platform.4  The first shift, often called ―Web 2.0,‖ is fundamentally 
about what we use computers to do.  We have moved from creating docu-
ments in Microsoft Office to living life online: searching on Google, buying 
and selling on eBay, watching the newest viral video on YouTube, and 
hanging out with our friends on mySpace and Facebook.  The second shift, 
often called cloud computing, is a change in the organization of the funda-
mental processes of computing—computation and storage.  These shifts are 
not fully independent; the cloud computing shift has some overlap with the 
 
 
 
1
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2
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3
  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). The European 
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4
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Web 2.0 shift.  Instead of storing my email on my laptop, I will just out-
source storage and store it with Google.  I won’t have an email product res-
ident on my computer; instead, Google will provide an email service 
through a Web browser.  
Google dominates the current Web 2.0 market.  And like Windows, 
Google’s infrastructure has no obvious boundaries.  Indeed, the Google en-
gine is in many ways more powerful than Microsoft’s.  It is not obvious 
how the size of Windows or its functionality affected the price that Micro-
soft could charge for Windows.  When Microsoft added browser functional-
ity to Windows, there was no direct increase in the price of Windows.  In 
contrast, Google’s ―price‖ scales up directly with each added service that it 
finances through advertising.  Google’s expansion model results in addi-
tional revenue with each ad that is clicked.  Like Windows, Google’s busi-
ness has no obvious boundaries.  The limit seems to be the content or 
services that can be supported by advertising and might be as large as any-
thing mediated by a display screen.  However, unlike Windows, Google’s 
revenue scales as more services are added. 
These two shifts have one key point in common: the possibility of 
creating prodigious amounts of data about end users.  The new Web inter-
mediaries at the heart of Web 2.0 have access to an enormous datastream 
about their users.  Google can learn a great deal about my interests with 
every search that I run.  Facebook learns about me as I build my profile and 
link to my friends.  Imagine how much a cloud storage provider might learn 
about me if it could read all of my stored email and documents.  These data 
are the lifeblood of Web 2.0 and could play a similarly important role as a 
cloud infrastructure emerges.  The advertising that supports much of the 
content on the Internet is much more valuable if it can be matched to my ac-
tual interests.  The flexibility of the Web in delivering content means that 
Web advertising is increasingly taking the form of tailored advertising, or 
so-called behavioral advertising. 
Determining how to regulate these datastreams is the central regulatory 
issue of the emerging computer infrastructure.  We already frequently regu-
late the way traditional intermediaries can use the information that passes 
through their hands. Banks, cable companies, phone companies—even your 
local video store—face strong restrictions on how they can use the informa-
tion seen as they process many of our transactions.  Laws disable them—
wholly or partially—from using that information.  In contrast, the emerging 
financial infrastructure for financing Web 2.0—free content paid for by on-
line advertising supported by rich databases—is largely unregulated.  We 
must consider how regulation of this transactional information affects com-
petition, and if the privacy issues are different in the online space.  Our 
choices here will not only have personal privacy consequences but also 
consequesces on how much competition will emerge.  Both consequences 
are tightly linked. 
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Section I of this Essay describes the shift in the computing platform 
away from desktop towards Web 2.0 and cloud computing.  Section II looks 
at two examples of ―sticky‖ data and the way in which that stickiness oper-
ates as a barrier to entry.  Section III focuses on how datastreams are used 
now, taking search as a prominent example.  As Google moves from relying 
on publicly-available information for assessing relevance towards relying 
on collective intelligence, it will increasingly emphasize the rich informa-
tion available to it in the datastream.  So far, at least, Google is able to do 
that because it doesn’t face the same legal barriers on data use that others 
do.  That difference in regulation limits competition that might otherwise 
emerge in how these rich datastreams are used.  And we will need to tread 
carefully as we rethink how competition and privacy interact.  Limits on 
disclosure of information across firms can have perverse effects as firms 
can circumvent those limits through horizontal or vertical integration. 
I. FINDING DATA OR THROWING DATA AWAY? 
We should start with desktop computing before the emergence of the 
Web.  Microsoft Office set the standard for desktop productivity tools.  
These were the tools that we used to create documents that resided on the 
hard disks in our desktops or laptops.  Outlook was used to manage calen-
dars, contacts, and email.  The CPUs in our computers churned away to do 
the calculations in an Excel spreadsheet or to format a document in Word.  
These documents were then distributed, on paper or via email, to be read by 
the recipients. 
Now think about what you use your computer for today.  In this new 
era, matching and coordination are the defining tasks we expect software to 
perform.  eBay is explicitly about creating a marketplace to match buyers 
and sellers.  Craigslist matches everything under the sun: buyers and sellers 
to be sure and job seekers galore, but also personals and house swaps, lost 
and found items, and rideshares.  Social networking sites like mySpace and 
Facebook match individuals to define new groups.  And Google matches 
people looking for content with the websites where that content is stored. 
This is the emergence of a new class of online intermediaries.  The 
emergence of these Web intermediaries is one of the defining aspects of 
Web 2.0.5  They typically operate over the Internet through a Web browser.  
They can charge transaction fees like eBay or charge for a job posting like 
Craigslist, or given the number of pageviews that take place, the interme-
diary can support all of the content with advertising as Google does.  With 
the ready ability to match advertising with content, a platform that generates 
pageviews is a valuable media property. 
 
 
 
5
  See Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Genera-
tion of Software, O’Reilly, Sept. 30, 2005, 
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103:1  (2008) Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/25/ 5 
But there is more.  Intermediaries have the ability to see what is hap-
pening with every click, and this creates an incredibly rich clickstream.6  
eBay may be able to figure out whether I am more of a Cubs fan than a 
White Sox fan and how much I like Pokémon.  Google has an even deeper 
knowledge of my interests because I search far more often than I buy or sell 
on eBay.  This datastream arises organically as part of the services per-
formed by the website.  As a society, we can choose to limit the use or dis-
closure of this information, but throwing away the information requires a 
deliberate engineering design choice by the intermediaries.  The informa-
tion otherwise emerges naturally from the role played by the intermediary. 
The idea of cloud computing is related to the emergence of Web inter-
mediaries, but a little different.  Computing power was first highly centra-
lized with mainframes, and then decentralized through the switch to 
minicomputers and PCs.  With the cloud, content and computing power will 
increasingly be managed centrally.7  The main problem with owning a PC is 
that you are your own tech support, and most of us are getting lousy ser-
vice.  Computers are complicated.  Badly run computers inflict harm on all 
of us when their power is harvested in botnets and computer spam is sent 
across the globe.  Finally, PCs are lumpy: you buy computing power at one 
time and not just when you need it. 
It doesn’t have to work that way.  Most people wouldn’t consider for a 
second generating their own electricity; they expect to get it from a socket 
and want to rely on the local electricity company to do the hard work.  We 
may be headed in that direction on computing power, both for calculation 
and storage.  Some content may be stored locally on your machine, while 
other content—content that you in some powerful sense think belongs to 
you—will be stored remotely.  Where actually?  You won’t have a clue. 
Most people probably don’t have strong feelings about where their 
computer calculations are done.  Whether most of the processing power ex-
ists locally is a detail.  If communications costs have dropped sufficiently 
such that we won’t notice when the computing is done remotely, we can re-
turn computing power to the center.  This is really just an engineering prob-
lem that turns on the relative costs of central as opposed to local processing 
power and on inter-computer as opposed to intra-computer communication.  
Important, to be sure, but not something most end-users will care about. 
But that analysis is crucially dependent on an implicit assumption, 
namely, that changing the location of processing or storage doesn’t change 
how the datastream is used.  Think of this as a version of cloud neutrality: 
where processing or storage is done should be irrelevant, or neutral, for out-
comes, legal or otherwise.  If instead my cloud provider monitored all of 
my spreadsheet calculations and then tailored advertising to match what it 
 
 
 
6
  See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 9–12 (Portfolio, 2005). 
7
  See generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO 
GOOGLE (2008). 
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had gleaned from the calculations—―Looks like he’s looking for a mort-
gage‖—that would be a big change.  The move to centralized processing 
and storage creates communications traffic that can be monitored. 
Email is a good example.  I have a separate email application (Micro-
soft Outlook) that I use to download email messages and store those on my 
laptop.  I also have an email account through Google (Gmail) that I manage 
through a Web browser.  That email is stored remotely with Google and 
Google dutifully notifies me of how much of ―my‖ storage space at Google 
that I have filled up.  I paid cash for Outlook but I ―pay‖ for Gmail by being 
exposed to the advertisements that it places on the far right edge of the 
screen.  Google filters my email to determine which ads to match with it.  
Send yourself an email on an obsurce subject and see what ads Google 
serves up. 
How we use the rich datastreams that have emerged under Web 2.0 and 
that may emerge under cloud computing is a point of both technical and le-
gal design.  Nothing about the change in the organization of computing re-
quires a change in information revelation, that is, how much information a 
third-party sees from someone using its product or service.  But, the change 
raises several questions about the use of such data: What happens to the da-
tastream flowing through the chokepoint?  How is that information used 
and controlled?  How does that affect both competition and privacy? 
II. DESIGNING STICKINESS AND DATA PORTABILITY 
Control over the the datastream affects competition.  Take an early 
Web 2.0 example: eBay.  eBay mediates transactions between strangers.  As 
a purchaser, how can I determine whether my prospective seller will deliver 
the listed item?  Transactions between strangers at a distance are a long-
standing problem in commercial law.  eBay solves this problem by creating 
stickiness with its user reputation and feedback scores.  eBay users build up 
a reputation score transaction by transaction and that reputation is the key 
way in which eBay mitigates the problem of transactions at a distance be-
tween strangers. 
But the eBay reputation system also has important competitive conse-
quences.  Since the reputation accumulates from prior transactions, a com-
peting auctions entrant starts with an immediate disadvantage.  eBay’s 
reputation system is sticky, or, put differently, it creates switching costs.  A 
long-time seller on eBay has a reputation that she has built up carefully.  
But if she switches to the entrant, she will be a newbie again, and buyers 
will naturally be reluctant to transact with her.  But there is a ready solution: 
make the eBay identity and reputation portable.  If I am a good seller on 
eBay as ―HotDVDBuysNow,‖ I should be just as good on another site. 
The consequences of stickiness through user ratings and identities are 
not lost on eBay’s competitors.  They understand the way in which those 
scores create entry barriers for auction competitors.  Take the case of Re-
verseAuction.com.  eBay’s original business relied on ascending price auc-
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tions.  Users would bid against each other for a fixed period of time, and at 
the end of the auction, the high bid won.  ReverseAuction entered with a 
declining-price auction website.  Sellers offered items for sale, and the of-
fered price declined until a buyer jumped in to buy at the current price.  
Once that happened, the auction was over.8 
ReverseAuction almost certainly understood the competitive disadvan-
tage it faced against eBay.  According to the complaint filed by the Federal 
Trade Commission, to solve that problem ReverseAuction registered as an 
eBay user, agreeing to the eBay user agreement.9  ReverseAuction was then 
able to harvest information from eBay’s website by acquiring eBay user 
IDs, email addresses, and feedback ratings.  ReverseAuction then sent an 
email to eBay’s users suggesting that they could reserve their eBay identi-
ties at ReverseAuction and that they should do quickly lest they lose that 
opportunity.10 
The FTC found ReverseAuction’s actions troubling, but there was also 
a kernel of virtue in ReverseAuction’s actions as eBay’s control over user 
reputations blocked competition in online auctions.  The critical point is 
that portability—or the absence thereof—is a design point.  eBay’s user 
agreement bars users from ―importing or exporting feedback information 
off of the Sites or for using it for purposes unrelated to eBay.‖11  The natural 
take-away from this is that eBay understandably wants to lock-in its users 
and hopes to do that by restricting the extent to which the valuable eBay-
based reputations can be used elsewhere.  Reputation and feedback ratings 
are tools that allow the auction house to make past transactions relevant to-
day.  For law, the question is whether we should limit user agreements that 
block reputation portability, whether that portability is sought by users di-
rectly or by competitors. 
Consider another example of portability.  I use RSS—Real Simple 
Syndication—and Google Reader to manage much of the information that 
flows through my computer.  If you want to know what I am interested in 
right now, you could look at my Google Reader tag cloud.  But the right 
question for law is: as we move from products and local storage to services 
and centralized storage, who owns the data and what establishes rights to 
access and use the data?  Suppose, for example, that I wanted to drop 
Google Reader and switch to another tool for managing RSS, say FeedDe-
mon.  I can obviously just starting running FeedDemon, but would I have to 
 
 
 
8
  Complaint, ¶7, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., Civ. Action No. 000032 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2000) 
[hereinafter ReverseAuction Complaint].  The complaint and other case documents for Federal Trade 
Commission v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., including the stipulated consent agreement and statements 
from FTC commissioners, are available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/reverseauction/index.shtm 
(link). 
9
  Id. at ¶8. 
10
  Id. at ¶12 (quoting the email sent by ReverseAuction to eBay users). 
11
  eBay, Your User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html (last vi-
sited June 23, 2008) (link). 
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re-type or re-link to the feeds to get them into FeedDemon?  And what of 
my tagged items?  I don’t know how to tell how many items I have in 
Google Reader with tags, but I suspect that the relevant order of magnitude 
is in the thousands. 
The answer on the feeds is OPML.  OPML is the Outline Processor 
Markup Language, and it is used precisely to create an XML file that 
should be readable by another RSS program. This isn’t as easy as switching 
from Diet Pepsi to Diet Coke (the contrary choice is inconceivable) but, it is 
possible, assuming that your RSS reader supports importing and exporting 
OPML. 
We can count on competitors to help lower these switching costs.  We 
saw that above with ReverseAuction.  In another classic case, Lotus Devel-
opment Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,12 Borland did this when it sold 
the spreadsheet Quattro Pro with an alternative interface that emulated that 
of Lotus 1-2-3, the dominant spreadsheet of the day.  Lotus tried to rely on 
copyright law to defeat Borland and failed.13  When I switched my main 
browsing program from Internet Explorer to Firefox, Firefox looked on my 
hard disk to find the links that I had stored as IE Favorites, again reducing 
the transaction costs of switching. 
But there are limits on the ability of competitors to lower switching 
costs.  Moving the list of feeds over through OPML is just one small piece 
of my information.  The detailed matching of news stories and tags 
represents a much greater share of the value, and I don’t see any particularly 
easy way to export that information into another RSS program.  Indeed, we 
see how design matters when we look at transferring my tagged stories.  I 
don’t think much, if any, of my Google Reader info is stored locally on my 
machine.  Therefore, there would be no locally stored information for the 
alternate RSS-tool FeedDemon to examine were I trying to switch over both 
my feeds list and my tagged stories.  And the question is whether FeedDe-
mon could write something that would burrow through my Google Reader 
―subscription‖ to extract my tagged stories. 
As the Lotus/Borland saga makes clear, law matters for switching costs 
and portability.  Sometimes that law will be copyright law.  Other times it 
will be antitrust.  For example, the European Union has tried to force Mi-
crosoft to disclose more information to increase interoperability between 
operating systems and servers.14  In other cases, we will legislate portability 
 
 
 
12
  49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per curium).  Justice Stevens took no part 
in the consideration or decision of Lotus, and the Court’s vote was equally divided among the remaining 
eight justices.  Lotus Dev. Corp., 516 U.S. 233 (link). 
13
  See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 819 (―[T]he Lotus menu command hierarchy is uncopyrightable 
subject matter, [and therefore] Borland did not infringe Lotus’s copyright by copying it.‖). 
14
  See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the European Microsoft 
Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 332, 332–34 (2008) 
(link). 
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and interoperability, as we have done with telephone number portability15 
and as parts of Europe may push Apple on iTunes and the iPod.16 
III. CONTROLLING HOW DATA ARE USED 
To see further how control of users’ datastreams can implicate privacy 
and competition concerns, we should return to Google and consider how 
Google might use the datastreams that arise in search.  Search is an exercise 
in relevance: for any search term presented, the search engine wants to re-
turn the ―best‖ matches.  How should we assess best?  Brin and Page’s orig-
inal search patent is for their PageRank algorithm.  This algorithm looks to 
the link structure of the Web to measure importance and therefore relev-
ance.17  If we are looking for information about the Chicago Cubs and many 
pages link to a particular page about the Cubs, we might conclude that that 
is a particularly relevant page.  The PageRank approach emphasizes infor-
mation that is available publicly.  Any entrant could do the same, assuming 
they could do so consistent with the original patent. 
PageRank doesn’t rely on the datastreams that arise in search.  But we 
might imagine an approach that does so and relies more directly on collec-
tive intelligence. Focus on how searchers respond to the presented search 
results.  If searchers routinely reject the first listed item for the second, we 
would be learning something about the perceived relevance of the results.  
That approach, multiplied over many users and an almost infinite number of 
searches, would create a system that learns and evolves in response to what 
users are doing.18  If that learning improved relevance, more searchers 
would seek to rely on the system, and that in turn would generate more 
learning.  This positive feedback loop would operate as a barrier to entry 
because, unlike the publicly observable page-link information at the heart of 
PageRank, learning through search results relies on private information 
available only to the search engine. 
These very different approaches to the use of the datastreams are avail-
able to Google and that is just in framing how relevance is assessed, the 
core function of search.  The datastream could also be used in behavioral 
advertising to match the ads presented next to the search results with the 
searcher rather than just matching the ads to the text content of a page as 
 
 
 
15
  FCC, Wireless Local Number Portability (Wireless LNP) Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/NumberPortability/ (last visited July 25, 2008) (link). 
16
  See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 285, 285 (―Multiple jurisdictions in the European Community have claimed that 
Apple has violated [] competition laws . . . .‖) (link). 
17
  See Our Search: Google Technology, http://www.google.com/technology/ (last visited June 23, 
2008) (link). 
18
  See Posting of Hal Varian to The Official Google Blog (Mar. 4, 2008, 7:04 PST) 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/why-data-matters.html (link). 
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AdSense typically does now.19  John Wanamaker, the department store 
magnate, famously observed that he wasted half of the money that he spent 
on advertising, but ―I don’t know which half.‖20  And Wanamaker may have 
been optimistic.  Think about TV advertising and how many ads that you 
see for products that you never consume.  Those ads are almost all wasted. 
Behavioral advertising offers the promise of tailoring ads to individual con-
sumers greatly increasing the efficiency of each ad dollar spent. 
In the past, we have placed extensive controls on how intermediaries 
can use the information that flows through their hands.  For example, the 
Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of 1984 added privacy protec-
tions for consumers.21  The current version of the CCPA requires written or 
electronic consent of cable customers before the cable operator can use the 
cable system to collect personally identifiable information about its custom-
ers.22  However, it also creates an exception to that rule allowing collection 
of such information to detect cable theft and, more generally, ―to obtain in-
formation necessary to render a cable service or other service provided by 
the cable operator to the subscriber.‖23  Whether collecting information to 
implement behavioral advertising will qualify under this safe harbor is an 
open question.  The cable statute also bars disclosure of personally identifi-
able information to third parties.24  However, the statute also exempts dis-
closures ―necessary to render, or conduct a legitimate business activity 
related to, a cable service or other service provided by the cable operator to 
the subscriber.‖25 
How we implement privacy restrictions matters enormously, and in-
deed, the limits can sometimes have perverse consequences like undermin-
ing competition policy.  For example, a disclosure limit of the sort seen in 
the cable statute artificially pushes towards vertical integration.  A firm will 
have an artificial incentive to expand the size and scope of the firm so as to 
use the information fully because most disclosure limits do not prevent dis-
closure within a particular firm, but only bar disclosure across firm bounda-
ries.26  Vertical integration renders the disclosure limit ineffective.  We 
might see mergers that would otherwise be unattractive as a way to circum-
vent the disclosure limits. 
 
 
 
19
  See Saul Hansell, Google Tries Tighter Aim for Web Ads, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008, C1, availa-
ble at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/google-tests-using-your-search-data-to-tailor-ads-to-
you/ (titled online as Google Tests Using Your Search Data to Tailor Ads to You) (link). 
20
  See Advertising Age, The Advertising Century: John Wanamaker, 
http://adage.com/century/people006.html (last visited Jul. 21, 2008) (link). 
21
  Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L.  No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. § 551). 
22
  47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(1) (2006) (link). 
23
  Id. § 551(b)(2)(A). 
24
  Id. § 551(c)(1). 
25
  Id. § 551(c)(2)(A). 
26
  See, e.g., id. § 551(c)(1). 
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Note also that disclosure may not be the act of relevance here.  
Google’s ad placement service, AdSense, does not disclose any information 
to facilitate matches between content and consumers.27  For Google’s adver-
tisers the information will be in a black box.  These advertisers will be able 
to evaluate the click-through rates that they are seeing from the use of the 
information controlled by Google, but they need never see the information 
itself.  No disclosure of the datastream, just use on the advertiser’s behalf.  
Indeed, as suggested before, Google would almost certainly prefer not to 
disclose the information, since disclosing the information gives up the con-
trol that Google has from its exclusive access to the information. 
CONCLUSION 
With Web 2.0, we have once again changed how we use computers.  
That change has brought with it new intermediaries who sit at the cros-
sroads of the matching and coordination that defines how we use the Inter-
net today.  Those intermediaries—Google first and foremost—have access 
to extraordinarily detailed information about their customers.  That infor-
mation arises naturally from the very services they provide.  We will see a 
similar pattern as cloud computing becomes more important, and cloud ser-
vice providers will also have available to them a rich datastream that arises 
from their customer’s activities. 
To date, these intermediaries have faced few limitations in how they 
use the information that they see.  These intermediaries can use this infor-
mation to improve their core businesses—adding collective intelligence to 
search to increase relevance—and to finance—through advertising backed 
by rich databases that allows ads to be matched to individual customers—
virtually any content or service that can be provided through a screen.  To 
focus on Google as the largest player in this space, there is no obvious limit 
to its scale and an advertising-supported business adds revenue with each 
additional screen that is viewed. 
In the past, we have regulated intermediaries at these transactional bot-
tlenecks such as banks, cable companies, phone companies and limited the 
ways in which they can use the information that they see.  Presumably the 
same forces that animated those rules—fundamental concerns about cus-
tomer privacy—need to be assessed for our new information intermediaries.  
In doing that, we need to be acutely aware of how our choices influence 
competition.  An uneven playing field that allows one firm to use the in-
formation that it sees while blocking others from doing the same thing 
creates market power through limiting competition.  We rarely want to do 
that.  And privacy rules that limit how information can be used and shared 
 
 
 
27
  See Google, Welcome to AdSense, https://www.google.com/adsense/login/en_US/ (last visited 
June 23, 2008) (AdSense instead crawls the content of subscriber webpages and posts ads related to the 
content of individual subscriber websites.) (link). 
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across firms will artificially push towards greater consolidation, something 
that usually works against maintaining robust competition. 
 
 
